The trialogue negotiations on the amendment of Regulation (EU) 2019/631 resulted in a legally coherent and technically focused compromise. Yet, in narrowing the scope of the regulation to emissions performance alone, many of the European Parliament’s more ambitious proposals were set aside. While often dismissed as exceeding the legal basis of environmental policy, these proposals should not be understood as misguided. On the contrary, they reflect a broader and increasingly necessary vision of the green transition — one that extends beyond emissions and into the social, industrial, and economic fabric of the European Union.
The problem, therefore, was not the substance of the Parliament’s ideas, but the legal instrument through which they were introduced.
A closer look at the amendments reveals that different political groups within the European Parliament approached the green transition from distinct but complementary angles.
The Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats (S&D), together with the Greens and The Left, focused on the social dimension of the transition. Proposals addressing affordability, access to mobility, and the redistribution of revenues from emissions penalties were designed to ensure that climate policy does not disproportionately burden vulnerable groups. Similarly, the requirement for manufacturers to adopt workforce transition plans aimed to mitigate the impact of decarbonization on employment and regional economies. These concerns are not only legitimate, but central to the long-term sustainability of the transition. However, they fall more naturally within the scope of social policy instruments and funding mechanisms, such as the Just Transition Fund or the broader framework of the European Pillar of Social Rights, rather than a regulation primarily concerned with CO₂ emissions from vehicles.
In contrast, the Renew group adopted a more balanced and governance-oriented approach. While accepting the need for flexibility in the transition period, Renew emphasized that such flexibility must not undermine the overall climate ambition. Their proposal introduced safeguards to ensure that the three-year compliance window would not be interpreted as a weakening of environmental targets, combined with stronger monitoring and reporting requirements. This reflects a focus on maintaining regulatory credibility while allowing for practical implementation.
The European People’s Party (EPP), on the other hand, focused on technological neutrality and industrial competitiveness. Their amendments proposed recognizing CO₂-neutral synthetic fuels (e-fuels) as a valid pathway to achieving emissions targets, accompanied by a certification framework based on lifecycle emissions. This approach aimed to preserve existing industrial strengths while expanding the range of technological solutions available to manufacturers.
Finally, proposals from The People for Europe (PfE) group emphasized the practical and economic realities of the transition. These included concerns about the affordability of vehicles, the uneven development of charging infrastructure, and the administrative burden placed on manufacturers. Their amendments sought to ensure that the transition remains accessible to consumers and feasible for industry, highlighting the importance of market conditions and real-world implementation.
Taken together, these proposals illustrate that the Parliament was not divided in its objectives, but rather diversified in its approach. Each political group identified a different dimension of the same problem: social fairness, regulatory integrity, industrial strategy, and economic feasibility.
However, the rejection of many of these amendments was not without justification. The European Commission consistently emphasized the limits of the legal basis under Article 192 TFEU, which confines this regulation to environmental objectives. Expanding it to include binding provisions on social policy, industrial investment, or broader economic governance would have risked legal uncertainty and potential annulment before the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The Parliament’s proposals were forward-looking and substantively relevant, but they were introduced within an instrument that was not designed to carry such a wide policy scope. In other words, the ideas were appropriate — the legal matter was not.
Seen from this perspective, the trialogue outcome does not represent a rejection of these broader concerns, but rather a postponement. The issues raised by the Parliament remain unresolved, and they are likely to resurface in other legislative arenas — whether in social policy frameworks such as the Just Transition Fund, industrial initiatives like the Net-Zero Industry Act, or transparency mechanisms including the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive.
If the European Union is to navigate this transition effectively, it will need to find ways to integrate these dimensions more coherently. The Parliament’s amendments, though rejected in this context, offer a glimpse of what such an integrated approach might look like.
In that sense, the conclusion is clear: the Parliament was not wrong. It was simply driving in the right direction — just on the wrong track.